Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are computer-based instruments used to assess the implications 18 of human activity on the human and earth system. They are simultaneously also used to explore 19 possible response strategies to climate change. As IAMs operate simplified representations of real-20
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Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are computer-based instruments used to assess the implications 42 of human activity on the human and earth system. They are simultaneously also used to explore 43 possible response strategies to climate change. Scenarios generated by these models inform policy 44 makers on elements such as the timing of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, required 45 changes in technological infrastructure, and the potential contribution of different world regions to 46 limiting global temperature increase (e.g. Calvin Literature evaluating the ability of IAMs (and related models) to capture future energy system change 63 has emphasised the difficulty of using formal model validation methods (Schwanitz, 2013 O 'Neill, 2006) . Although such studies provide useful insights on the performance of IAMs, they remain 76 focused on past insights and take little note of current or prospective innovation processes and 77 development. Hence, comparative methods that rely on historical data and trends assume continuity 78 of the past and may therefore be less meaningful in situations where trends are changing (National 79
Research Council, 2010). 80 81
Several strands of literature have applied alternative methods to provide insights on future 82 developments (Wilson et al., 2017) . Systematically consulting specialists in a field of expertise is one 83 example. Experts are assumed to have the ability to interpret the wealth of (tacit) information on 84 current societal and technological trends and consider their implications for the future. Collecting this 85 knowledge through expert elicitation has the advantage of gauging uncertainties beyond current 86 conditions (Bosetti et al., 2016 The IAMs in this study provide a wide range of possible transition pathways over time and towards the 137 2 °C objective (see Figure A1 in the Supplementary information). This breadth in outcome is a result of 138 methodological and structural differences between these IAMs, which can be expressed in terms of 139 variation in the coverage of the economy, the degree of foresight, the level of detail in spatial, sectoral 140 and technological resolution, and assumptions or constraints on the speed of technology diffusion (see 141  Table 1 ) (Kriegler et al., 2015) . By combining diverse models in an inter-comparison study, we can 142 assess the robustness of projected long-term developments within a range of embedded structural 143 uncertainty (Wilson et al., 2017) . In this study it is therefore more of interest to focus on the collective 144 pattern observed across these IAMs than the individual model responses. To prevent a selective draw 145
of model outcomes, we tested whether the patterns of the current subset of IAM models and scenarios 146 deviate significantly from the full set of result as found in the IPCC's AR5 Scenario Database (IPCC, 147 2014). We found that the IAM models and scenarios in explained the project aim and invited to take part in the elicitation. To boost sample sizes, participating 218 experts were also requested to propose alternative or additional participants following a snowball 219 sampling technique. This network approach proved particularly useful for identifying bioenergy and 220 nuclear experts in our study. 221 222
A total of 39 experts took part in our elicitation (33% of the 117 experts contacted), including 223 representatives of universities or research institutes (51%), member-based organisations dedicated to 224 a specific technology (21%), governmental agencies (15%), private sector (8%) and intergovernmental 225 organisations (5%) (see Table 2 and Annex B in the Supplementary materials). Overall, the participating 226 experts formed a diverse group covering both theoretical and practical knowledge. Per energy supply 227 technology individually, the samples vary in size (see Table 2 ). Although no rule exists on how many 228 experts are needed in an expert elicitation, five to six specialists are considered to be a lower bound 229 for representing most of the expertise and breadth of opinion, provided that the experts have a broad 230 understanding of the problem (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1991; Morgan, 2014 In the first part of the comparative analysis we focused on the relative contribution of specific energy 318 technologies to total electricity supply under Baseline and 2 Degrees policy assumptions by 2050. For 319 experts, ranking the energy technology's contribution to future power supply was an explicit question. 320
For IAMs, a similar ranking was constructed by assigning ranks to the average relative contribution of 321 energy technologies to total power supply (with the largest relative contribution receiving the number 322 one ranked position, the second largest relative contribution the second ranked position, etc.). 
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We find that the IAMs and experts are broadly in agreement about the role of different technologies 339 under business-as-usual conditions in 2050 (Baseline, left panel of Figure 1 ). Both IAMs and experts 340 expect fossil fuels to remain the dominant energy source, followed by renewable power sources 341 (particularly wind). Some differences are found for the relative position of solar and nuclear power, 342
showing experts' greater preference for solar power and IAMs' preference for nuclear power. Overall, 343 the expert responses reach a wider range of results than IAMs, which appears to be independent of 344 the scenario and to some degree the technology being considered (see also Annex D in the 345
Supplementary information). This difference in perspective could be a reflection of IAMs adopting a 346 more optimal techno-economic perspective, while experts are able to implicitly or explicitly 347 incorporate, for example, socio-political considerations into their assessment. 348 349
Under stringent climate policy considerations (2 Degrees, right panel of Figure 1) Table 3 . In Figure 2 we depict the range of outcomes for the Baseline scenario and in Figure 3 band for this technology family in Figure 3 ). 431 432
We also found some areas of agreement between the estimates of experts and IAMs in a 2 Degrees 433 scenario. This is clearly observed for wind power in the short-term, showing that IAM and expert 434 estimates converge and reach greater agreement under 2 Degrees than depicted earlier under Baseline 435 considerations (as shown by the p-value and the reasonable or "OK" evaluation for installed capacity). 436
However, IAMs' projected share of wind in power production is considerably lower than adopted by 437 experts, which underscores a difference in the implied capacity factor between experts and IAMs. As 438 the study considers technology "families" on a global scale, this difference may also be an outcome of 439 conflating expectations for (onshore and offshore) wind technologies and regional potentials. For 440 bioelectricity we also observe that the estimates of experts and IAMs converge in a 2 Degrees scenario, 441 implying that both agree that stringent climate policies can mobilise more large-scale application of 442 biomass in power generation. This is confirmed in the open-ended comments where experts 443 articulated that biomass co-firing can be very effective as it can be installed relatively quickly and 444 retrofitted into existing capital. The experts, however, emphasised that this is only possible if explicit 445 incentives are implemented that move biomass into power generation and away from other 446 applications. Some limits to this alignment can be observed, as perspectives start to diverge again by 447 2050 (as indicated in the high or "HI" evaluation in Figure 3 ) which relates to the observed preference 448 of IAMs to deploy bioenergy with CCS instead (Figure 1 ). 449 450
For nuclear power no significant or consistent difference can be observed between experts and IAMs. 451
Both provide higher estimates in the 2 Degrees scenario than assumed under Baseline considerations 452 over the short-term, underlining that both elicitation groups employ implicit near-term assumptions 453 on newly planned capacity. Moreover, despite a greater tendency in IAMs to adopt nuclear energy in 454 the electricity mix (Figure 1 ), the estimated shares in power production are considered relatively equal 455 between experts and IAMs (as also indicated by a p-value > 0.8). 456 457 458 Experts were also asked to rate the mean (point) estimate of IAM projections for their field of expertise 472 and the metrics as shown in Table 3 using verbal expressions ranging from "very high" to "very low". 473
Overall these ratings were found to be consistent with the direct elicitation outcomes, meaning that 474 visually and statistically different estimates were subsequently evaluated as either (very) high or (very) 475 low, and vice versa. Some exceptions can be found, which may be a result of including a broader 476 spectrum of perspective in the indirect elicitation method (such as found for the Biomass elicitation 477 group, representing a larger sample of experts than considered during the direct elicitation method, 478
see 
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In this study we have identified areas in which IAM projections either compare or diverge in systematic 487
ways from expert interpretations of future energy system change. In the following section we will 488 discuss several aspects that are considered to be of importance to understanding the results. 489 490
An important aspect in interpreting the results is time. Both experts and IAM models are exposed to 491 information on long-term historical trends (e.g. of the last thirty years) and short-term historical trends 492 (e.g. of the last five years). However, IAM models are more dependent on long-term historical datasets 493 than experts, as they use these datasets to draw out empirical patterns to build a perspective on the 494 future. In order to account or correct for unforeseen developments over time, IAM models are 495 continuously updated or calibrated, with some years between each modification cycle. that are closer aligned to the expert expectations for both the ranking (as can be deducted from the 540 central nodes moving towards the diagonal line in Figure D2 of Annex D) as the quantitative projection 541 exercise (particularly showing for solar PV in Figure D4 in Annex D). However, an exception is observed 542 for bioenergy with CCS, which maintains its deviating position under a wide variety of scenario 543 narratives, underscoring again the structural difference in perspective between IAMs and experts for 544 this technology. 545 546
A third aspect considered important in interpreting the results is the considered range of result and 547 associated uncertainty. In order to focus on the robust patterns, we have compared the median 548 estimates of IAMs and experts in this study and used the range of outcome as a measure of agreement 549 among the different elicitation groups. In light of the discussions in scenario literature on the 550 differences in needed mitigation efforts between a 1.5 °C and 2 °C objective, it would have been 551 interesting to have also confronted experts with the high estimates of both the IAM and expert 552 projections. Future work could therefore extent the current analysis by confronting the same set of 553 experts with the broader range of outcomes. Such a procedure would bring different sources of 554 knowledge together to reflect on the different outcomes, yielding further insights on the assumed 555 context, depicted magnitudes and the implications of such development over time. This may be 556 particularly relevant in areas for which experts and IAMs have structural differences in perspective. 557
For example, experts articulated an explicit need for policy to move biomass into power generation 558 and away from liquid fuel production in order to reach the levels of deployment as presented in this 559 study. Interestingly, Calvin et al. (2013) found that most of the scrutinised IAMs in this study dedicate 560 a larger share of biomass resources to liquid fuel production than to power generation, implying an 561 substantial increase in the use of bioenergy in both sectors. These differences in scale and perspective 562 underline a more structural disagreement between IAMs and experts on the availability and economics 563 of mitigation alternatives in the liquids and electricity production sectors, which ideally would need to 564 be further discussed in future work. 565 
Conclusion
